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International Conventions and the Failure of a Transnational Approach 
to Controlling Asian Crime Business 
 
Mark Findlay & Nafis Hanif1 
 
Abstract 
The paper argues that without a realistic understanding of criminal enterprise located against the 
commercial forces shaping contemporary Asian market contexts, then domestic, bi-lateral, regional and 
international control initiatives are not only likely to fail in their regulatory objectives, but the premises 
on which they are constructed may heighten the market conditions for crime business profitability. 
The international convention-based approach to regulating transnational and organized crime is the 
framework from which a critique of non-market centred law enforcement control concentrations is 
developed.   This critique reveals the transposition of flawed normative control considerations from 
domestic to supra-national control contexts, and shows how this in turn constrains and is constrained by 
organized crime research. 
The paper suggests a novel methodology for understanding Asian crime business in its specific market 
realities and conditions.  The analysis calls for a shift away from the normative ascription to supply 
directed regulatory emphasis.  In conclusion, conventional crime control perspectives and directives can 
usefully be critiqued from their international as well as their domestic frames, enabling the creation of a 
refined and holistic legal response at each level that is supported by and not retarded with holistic 
research understandings. 
Key words 
International conventions 
Criminal enterprise 
Market modeling 
Organized and transnational crime 
                                                          
1
 Mark Findlay is Professor of Criminal Justice, Law School, University of Sydney, a Professor in the Law School at 
Singapore Management University, and Professor of International Criminal Justice, Law School, University of Leeds.  
Nafis Hanif is a doctoral scholar in the Law School, University of Sydney. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950031
2 
 
 
Introduction 
What stands in the way of effectively regulating Asian crime business?  What follows is the critical case 
for a new research-led approach to the transnational regulation of Asian crime business.  The paper 
argues that without a realistic understanding of criminal enterprise located against the commercial 
forces shaping contemporary Asian market contexts, then domestic, bi-lateral, regional and 
international control initiatives are not only likely to fail in their regulatory objectives, but the premises 
on which they are constructed may heighten the market conditions for crime business profitability.2   
 
We suggest that the false or masking law enforcement dualities on which much organized crime 
research is based have retarded the capacity of domestic and international regulators and policy-makers 
to understand crime business as a market reality and to structure regulatory strategies accordingly.  Of 
particular interest to international law scholars is the recent international legal discourse surrounding 
the regulation of transnational organized crime which we argue exhibits, and perhaps grows from, the 
same failings of narrow dualist organized crime research traditions. To establish this critique the paper 
commences with a brief exploration of the recent UN convention on transnational and organized crime 
for the purpose of revealing how market understandings and regulatory responses to crime business 
have been sidelined in these developments, to the specific detriment of vulnerable and compromised 
Asian jurisdictions. We see this as a consequence of a misguided domestic history of law-enforcement 
oriented organized crime research and its uncritical translation into international from domestic law.  
Further, we speculate that the transnational and international legal responses to the pervasive presence 
of crime business, if not broken free of a self-interested normative law enforcement frame will 
perpetuate the model dualities which have plagued domestic regulation in the field.  
 
The paper suggests a novel methodology for understanding Asian crime business in its specific market 
realities and conditions.  The analysis calls for a shift away from the normative ascription to supply 
directed regulatory emphasis.  In conclusion, conventional crime control perspectives and directives can 
usefully be critiqued from their international as well as their domestic frames, enabling the creation of a 
refined and holistic legal response at each level that is supported by and not retarded with holistic 
research understandings. 
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The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime – Ratifying Normative 
Distractions 
After some protracted diplomatic negotiations in the symbolically significant Sicilian capital of Palermo, 
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime was settled (2000).3 It was a 
document centred on law enforcement engagement: 
If crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement
4 
 The foreword to the convention by the then UN Secretary General set a clear law enforcement tone for 
the purposes5 of the convention: 
If crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement. If the rule of law is undermined not only in 
one country, but in many, then those who defend it cannot limit themselves to purely national 
means. If the enemies of progress and human rights seek to exploit the openness and 
opportunities of globalization for their purposes, then we must exploit those very same factors 
to defend human rights and defeat the forces of crime, corruption and trafficking in human 
beings... Criminal groups have wasted no time in embracing today’s globalized economy and the 
sophisticated technology that goes with it. But our efforts to combat them have remained up to 
now very fragmented and our weapons almost obsolete. The Convention gives us a new tool to 
address the scourge of crime as a global problem. With enhanced international cooperation, we 
can have a real impact on the ability of international criminals to operate successfully and can 
help citizens everywhere in their often bitter struggle for safety and dignity in their homes and 
communities.6 
The statement of purpose for the Convention in Article 1 is clear, co-operative and interventionist: 
The purpose of this Convention is to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational 
organized crime more effectively. 
 
The identification of offences covered by the act ranged from specific money laundering and corruption 
to the broader crime of participation in organized criminal groups. The control mechanisms in addition 
                                                          
3
 It is not coincidental that the approach of the convention and its prevention strategies is founded on the 
inextricable nexus between transnational and organised crime. 
4
 Hereafter referred to as UNCAOTC, Foreword p.iii 
5
 For a detailed discussion of the history, origins, emergence and purpose of the convention see Vlassis, D. (2002)  
The Global Situation of Transnational Organised Crime, the Decision of the International Community to Develop an 
International Convention and the Negotiation Process, UNIFAE Resource Material Series No.59 
6
 UNCAOTC, Foreword p.iii-iv 
4 
 
to prosecution conviction and sentence rely upon confiscation and seizure of assets and their disposal, 
as well as extradition of suspects. Mutual legal assistance and joint investigations emphasise the 
collaborative intention for investigation, confiscation and prosecution.  For instance, Article 26 details 
particular measures to enhance co-operation between law enforcement agencies. Article 30 identifies 
inducements for the adoption of the convention obligations, through economic development aid and 
technical assistance.  
 
The prevention of crimes targeted under the convention is an area where more than law enforcement is 
envisaged.  Article 31 2) proposes: 
States Parties shall endeavour, in accordance with fundamental principles of their domestic law, 
to reduce existing or future opportunities for organized criminal groups to participate in lawful 
markets with proceeds of crime, through appropriate legislative, administrative or other 
measures. 
That said, all the listed measures to follow relate to law enforcement and legal accountability processes 
of one form or another. 
 
The only recognition of organized or transnational crime as a market phenomenon appears in article 31 
2) and in the context of the subverting legitimate market opportunity. There is no reference to 
organized or transnational crime as a business or enterprise. As, mentioned earlier none of the 
prosecution and sanction strategies have a commercial perspective.  The use of asset confiscation and 
disposal as a prevention measure is directed against the capitalization of crime. Even so, these measures 
are couched as the province of law enforcement. 
 
Law enforcement agency as potentially contributing to the proliferation of crime business is limited in 
the convention’s coverage to recognizing the corruption of public officials.  When dealing with this issue 
the convention prefers to see it as an independent offence type rather than a critical market factor in 
the proliferation and profitability of particular criminal enterprise.  The Secretary General’s foreword on 
the other-hand does tilt at this possibility: 
Arrayed against these constructive forces (of civil society), however, in ever greater numbers 
and with ever stronger weapons, are the forces of what I call “uncivil society”. They are 
terrorists, criminals, drug dealers, traffickers in people and others who undo the good works of 
civil society. They take advantage of the open borders, free markets and technological advances 
5 
 
that bring so many benefits to the world’s people. They thrive in countries with weak 
institutions, and they show no scruple about resorting to intimidation or violence. Their 
ruthlessness is the very antithesis of all we regard as civil. They are powerful, representing 
entrenched interests and the clout of a global enterprise worth billions of dollars, but they are 
not invincible.7 
 
Of the Asian jurisdictions in which our research into crime business has an interest, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and India have ratified8 the convention largely without qualification.9 
 
More than a decade on from the signing of the convention there have been critical reflections at the 
international level regarding its impact and sustainability. At the 64th General Assembly Plenary Session 
speakers recognized the need, ten years from the convention, for ‘stronger global follow-up’: 
As the General Assembly today concluded its special high-level meeting on transnational 
organized crime, speakers agreed that the best way to stamp out organized crime and mark the 
tenth anniversary this year of the landmark United Nations Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime and its additional Protocols was through stronger global follow-up and 
coordination. 
Organized crime worldwide was on the rise as gangs, terrorists, money launderers, drug and 
human traffickers, and cybercriminals exploited the more open borders and technological 
advances spurred by globalization, delegates said.  It threatened international peace and 
security and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.  Trafficking in persons, they 
stressed, was particularly egregious and a crime against humanity. 
Some speakers suggested that the United Nations set up a review mechanism to chart progress 
and identify obstacles to implementing the United Nations treaty, also known as the Palermo 
Convention, while others called for formation of a global action plan to combat trafficking in 
persons by the end of the current General Assembly session.10 
Interestingly among the interventions at the meeting from Asian states: 
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Indonesia’s representative, however, warned against reinventing the wheel, saying the (review) 
mechanism (in the convention) already enshrined in the Convention was sufficient to tackle 
implementation.  It was tempting to criticize the treaty, which was still in the early stages, and 
easier to come up with a new mechanism.  But enforcing the current one, albeit a more difficult 
course of action to follow, was indeed the best way forward. 
This status quo approach, much influenced as it is in Asian jurisdictions and their domestic legislation, by 
US and European law enforcement thinking is common in the political discourse regarding organised and 
transnational crime regulation across the region. 
 
In a meeting held at the International Peace Institute in New York (Jan 2011) to review the progress over 
the decade of the convention’s operation, the following considerations came in focus: 
This (meeting) is part of a renewed international interest in transnational organized crime and in 
efforts to counter it. The Palermo Convention, seen as the main international tool to counter 
TOC, has therefore also come under renewed scrutiny. How has TOC (transnational organised 
crime) evolved and changed over the past ten years and what role has the Palermo Convention 
played in countering it?11 
The report from the meeting, indicatively entitled Transnational Organized Crime and the Palermo 
Convention: A Reality Check,12 in its concluding section considers the Palermo Convention as well as 
some of the main difficulties facing the international community in addressing TOC. One area of 
difficulty cited recognises the failure to appreciate in a regulatory sense the market reality of TOC as 
crime business. 
The structural changes that seem to have occurred to TOC also suggest new terminology and 
theoretical models are needed. TOC can no longer be seen as a conspiracy of distinct criminal 
enterprises. Viewed as an activity, it is increasingly clear that TOC involves a wide range of 
actors, including corrupt officials, political groups, warlords, and so on. Future research will no 
doubt have to look into the political economy of organized crime to better understand the 
interplay among these different actors. 
How we go forward from this situation remains a tremendously intricate issue to resolve. 
Evaluating what has been done appears a vital task, yet arguably the methodology for doing so 
remains unclear. It is not enough to measure the implementation of the convention; the real 
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challenge lies in making the connection between the convention and real-world changes in the 
harm caused by organized crime. Moreover, it is worth noting that the mandate to undertake 
such difficult and controversial evaluations may be hard to gain from the member states of the 
Palermo Convention. 13 
 
In a critical paper presented to the British Society of Criminology (1999) entitled ‘Organised Crime – the 
Dumbing of Discourse’14 Michael Woodwiss identified the political imperatives behind international co-
operation in controlling organised crime, particularly in the drafting of international preventative 
instruments: 
US influence has helped ensure that most countries have come into step with an international 
prohibition-based drug control regime built around the framework established by UN 
conventions, beginning with the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs15.But the war on 
drugs, according to the UN's own admission, has failed16...And, as several money laundering 
scandals have shown, the massive profits available from the distribution as well as production of 
illegal drugs has encouraged the development of significant international criminal associations 
and networks amongst professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, corrupt officials, career 
criminals and simple opportunists17... By the post-Cold War era, however, American idealists 
were setting the international agenda and could not countenance conceptualisations of 
organized crime that implied a critique of American laws and institutions. On the contrary they 
needed the international community to accept a conceptualisation of organized crime that both 
excused the failure of national and international efforts against drugs and justified the 
expansion of these efforts. American politicians, government officials, journalists and academics 
thus sought ways to reduce the world's complexities to the same type of good versus evil 
propositions that served so well during the Cold War. The menace of transnational or global 
organized crime not only helped explain away the failure in the drug war but was as easy-to 
communicate as the Cold War policy of containing the world-wide spread of communism. 
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A Washington DC conference of high level American law enforcement and intelligence 
community personnel led the way in September 1994 by internationalising America's pluralist 
revision of the Mafia conspiracy theory. They began to propagate a very simple idea. Because 
forces outside of mainstream national cultures now threatened national institutions everywhere, 
American organized crime control techniques should be employed everywhere. These 
techniques were necessary to combat what the conference title referred to as Global Organized 
Crime: The New Empire of Evil.18... 
 
The keynote speaker at the conference, FBI Director Louis Freeh, stressed that "the ravages of 
transnational crime" were the greatest long-term threat to the security of the United States' and 
warned that the very fabric of democratic society was at risk everywhere. He was followed by 
CIA Director R. James Woolsey, who noted that "the threats from organized crime transcend 
traditional law enforcement concerns. They affect critical national security interests ... some 
governments find their authority besieged at home and their foreign policy interests imperilled 
abroad".19 This new global threat of organized crime required a tougher and more collaborative 
international response, more specifically it required more thorough information sharing 
between police and intelligence officials in different countries and improved methods of 
transcending jurisdictional frontiers in pursuing and prosecuting criminals.20 
 
Two months after the Washington conference, the United Nations held the World Ministerial 
Conference on Organized Transnational Crime and provided an international forum for the 
global pluralist theory of organized crime...The rhetoric and analysis was essentially the same as 
that employed by Freeh and Woolsey.  According to the UN's press-release, participants at the 
conference recognised the growing threat of organized crime, with its 'highly destabilizing and 
corrupting influence on fundamental social, economic and political institutions.' This 
represented a challenge demanding increased and more effective international cooperation. 
'The challenge posed by transnational organized crime,' the document continued, 'can only be 
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met if law enforcement authorities are able to display the same ingenuity and innovation, 
organizational flexibility and cooperation that characterize the criminal organizations 
themselves'21. Essentially, the same line as articulated by American politicians from the 1950s 
onwards...US-approved organized crime control strategies were emphasised by most speakers 
and this deferential consensus was most clearly reflected in another background document for 
this conference which singled out the 1970 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) statute as an example of 'dynamic' legislation able to 'adapt itself to ... developments.' 
...Western governments had been clearly moving towards the American organized crime control 
model even before the conference...22 
 
Interestingly he offered a vision of more effective international legalities based on a more pluralist 
theorizing of organized crime.  At the same time Woodwiss identified the problems associated with 
achieving this: 
There are, however, two main problems with the global pluralist theory of organized crime. The 
first is that Mafia-type groups only participate in illegal markets, despite countless claims to the 
contrary, they rarely, if ever, control them. Instead, as most conscientious researchers have 
noted, fragmentation and competition characterise drug and other illegal markets, not 
monopolisation.23 Governments, whether individually or jointly, would have few problems 
combating organized crime if it really was dominated by a relatively small number of super-
criminal organisations. They would eliminate the leadership of these organisations and that 
would be the end of the problem. 
 
The second problem with the global pluralist theory is that, like the Mafia conspiracy theory, it 
uses semantics to camouflage the involvement of respectable institutions in organized criminal 
activity. Throughout Boutros-Ghali's speech in Naples (Conference), for example, the implication 
was always that respectable institutions were threatened by organized crime. Organized crime, 
he said, 'poisons the business climate', it 'corrupts political leaders', it 'infiltrates the State 
apparatus.' Understood in this way, the only response to the organized crime 'forces of 
darkness' is a harmonised international effort on behalf of 'legitimate society'.24 However, as a 
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great deal of historical and contemporary research shows, government agencies and key 
institutions, such as corporations, have frequently gained from and sometimes helped to sustain 
organized crime.25 
 
The history of US organized crime itself demonstrates the inadequacy of global pluralist analysis 
as doubtless could the history of organized crime in any of the 138 countries represented at the 
UN conference. Organized criminal activity was never a serious threat to established or evolving 
economic and political power structures in the United States but more often a fluid, variable and 
open-ended phenomenon that complemented rather than conflicted with those structures. 
Seen in this light, the wisdom of using the pretext of organized crime control to give extra 
powers to the officialdom that supports these structures should at least be questioned. 
The international community is, however, unlikely to make any progress towards reducing the 
destructive impact of organized crime in all its many and varied forms while its understanding of 
the problem is based on an analytical framework that only serves to justify unworkable laws and 
whitewash flawed systems.26 
 
It would be incorrect to suggest that within its limited law enforcement frame the UNCAOTC has failed 
to generate international co-operation in the regulation of TOC.  As Hauck and Peterke observe: 
A recent evaluation shows, however, that the Convention is being increasingly applied by states 
as a legal basis for international co-operation, in particular with regard to extradition, mutual 
legal assistance, and confiscation of proceeds of crime. Yet many states parties still have not 
fully implemented the Convention. In this respect, important assistance is offered by the United 
Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC).27 
 
However, even such measures of influence are not capable of indicating why some states engage and 
others don’t, as well as the practical regulatory effects of the engagement already achieved if it is 
limited to law enforcement contexts. 
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The Collaboration of Research Methodology in Policy Distraction and Flawed Law-making 
 
It is not difficult to establish that recent international convention-based law-making to regulate 
transnational organised crime reflects a narrow law enforcement normative framework. Nor is it 
complex to argue that this process is reliant on and supportive of an equally narrow and constrained 
research tradition investigating the structures and institutions of organised crime.  The next section will 
outline these research traditions and in particular the problematic application of dialectical analysis.  
Having done this, the paper will advance a research approach which recognises the market significance 
of crime business.  As such this research approach is available to ‘evidence-based’ law-makers and policy 
administrators to inspire an integrated and holistic regulatory strategy which, we suggest, better meets 
the aspirations of the UNCAOTC, and provides a potential answer to Woodwiss’ pessimism about self-
serving analytical frameworks, and Standing’s argument for new terminology and theoretical models 
around TOC. 
 
Many dialectical understandings of conventional organized crime research, we suggest, are rooted in 
divergent methodological designs which in turn are informed and bounded by strong, if implicit, 
ideological and normative commitments to single variant themes such as race, class, business integrity, 
market corruption or the essential utility of legal regulation28. As we see it, these methodology ‘camps’ 
are divided along the following premises: 
 the researcher’s epistemological stance on the insider/outsider debate constructing the 
sampling process and observational engagement29, 
 the researcher’s inability to access the hierarchy of individuals occupying leadership roles in 
criminal organisation who can speak with mystery more sophisticated and diverse experience of 
criminal networks and entrepreneurial motivation, instead restricting the research sample to 
accessible rank and file members of criminal organisations whose knowledge of criminal 
networks and enterprises are telescoped30, 
 the researcher’s inclination to causality and falsification, allowing method and the data it 
procures to advance a narrow deductive theorisation or to subscribe to a value affirming theory 
that method is then supposed to inductively substantiate and affirm31, 
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 the reluctance or incapacity of the researcher to incorporate the tools developed by 
researchers from other disciplines into their particular research design in an attempt to expose 
the research subject to multi-variant analysis32, and 
 the ideologies sponsoring and  compromising the researchers or any central informants, limiting 
access and consequent research understandings within an externally legitimated frame33. 
 
The Foundations of Dialectical Tensions in Organised Crime Theorisation  
 
Contemporary organised crime analyses and research methodologies are replete with the dichotomised 
representations of businesses, markets and stake-holders. The functions of criminal enterprise are 
positioned along the axis of ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’, ‘functional’ or ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘orderly’ or ‘disorderly’. 
These dualisms have been historically institutionalised through conventional analytical frameworks in 
criminology like positivism, Merton’s social structure and anomie paradigm, sub-cultural studies and the 
‘crime control’ law enforcement perspective. This section of the paper will show that dialectical 
theorisations of crime business conceal the dynamic reality of criminal networks34 and enterprises, and 
stunt efforts to realistically appreciate organised crime as entrepreneurial motivation, market 
preferencing, consumer management and profitable business.35 It commences with a brief overview of 
originating and influential theoretical positions which operate and confirm distinctions between 
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ society.  A duality such as this has infected crime business research by 
imposing a normative divide across market structures and thereby, we argue, constricting possible 
research methodologies interested in universal market forces rather than artificial ‘legitimacies’ 
determining the nature and dynamics of enterprise.  This constriction in tern reduces the explanatory 
potential of enterprise theory when trying to understand the unique presence of crime business within 
particular commercial and consumer settings.36 
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Positivists view criminal groups as necessarily ‘dysfunctional’ units to be distinguished from the 
‘functional’ nature of legitimate institutions and markets. Theoretically from this normative perspective, 
criminal groups are unavoidably ‘dysfunctional’ since they are founded on loose and disorderly 
associations of ‘criminals’ with low intelligence and ‘pathological’ personalities, being afflicted with 
biological or psychological deficiencies, and socio-pathies, differentiable from ‘normal’ conformists.37 In 
their enterprise setting, criminal groups are organisational and structural contexts through which crime 
and deviance can be unreservedly pursued by families, racial collectives or secret societies with inherent 
psycho-social deficiencies.38 Criminal organisations are, in any such interpretation, theoretically devoid 
of ordered structure, rational culture, and entrepreneurial orientation.39 Positivist dichotomies prevail 
despite the absence of evidence to prove that members of criminal groups are afflicted with psycho-
social maladies that predispose them to violence more so compared to the general population of youth 
from poor areas, or that an association exists between joining a criminal group and low intelligence.40 
 
In the seminal “Social Structure and Anomie” Merton perpetuates dialectical tensions in our 
understanding of organised crime with a taxonomy of ‘innovation’/criminality and ‘conformity’ as 
mutually exclusive responses to anomie.41 Merton’s anomie results from ‘overtly emphasised culturally-
prescribed goals un-attenuated by an equally intense accent on the institutional or socially-approved 
means for achieving those goals, within a social structure where individuals have differential access to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
conceptualisations of organised crime that focus on the provision of illicit goods and services as an inextricable 
facet. Consumer demand and demand management are therefore isolated as crucial starting points in an attempt 
to holistically understand organised crime across context and through time. Demand is a neglected aspect of 
organised crime research although it is a defining feature of its conceptualisation. The marginalisation of a 
demand-side investigation is a corollary of normative assumptions about the distinctions between legal and illegal 
markets. Illegal markets are perceived to be a monopoly, violent, disorganised and consumers of illicit 
commodities are perceived to be powerless dependents of criminal entrepreneurs. Supply-side investigations too 
are prejudiced to analyse the ingenuity of criminal entrepreneurs independent of the underlying demand-
management strategy that underlie that ingenuity. To rectify dialectical assumptions about markets, we pursue a 
modelling exercise that analyses the extent to which the organisational structure of the group, business, which 
type of criminal trade is pursued are a reflection of demand-management strategies. In this modelling exercise, 
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institutional means to culturally prescribed goals’.42 Individual capacity to access the institutional means 
for attaining cultural goals within a particular social structure can be potentially facilitated or 
constrained by a variety of ascribed or achieved statuses within the essential structures and 
organisational relationships of criminal enterprise. ‘Innovators’/criminals adapt to anomie by accepting 
culturally prescribed goals but rejecting and substituting orthodox institutional means with the most 
expedient ‘innovative’ means, including crime, to pursue cultural goals. Merton conceptualises 
innovators as ‘outsiders’, whose ideology, values and group-sanctioned behaviour constitute an 
inversion of mainstream, middle-class culture that is assumed to be uniformly accepted by conformists. 
 
Merton’s paradigm was the theoretical foundation for subculture studies. Merton’s concept of outsiders 
fixes sub-cultural ethnographies into describing and analysing the culture of ‘innovators’ as a unique 
social system that is unequivocally opposed to the presumably homogeneous middle-class culture 
embraced by ‘conformists’ in the legitimate sector of society.43 Bourgois conceptualises organised 
criminal culture as ‘street culture’; ‘a complex and conflicting web of beliefs, symbols, modes of 
interaction, values and ideologies that  emerge in the opposition to exclusion from mainstream 
society’.44 This oppositional culture is a lifestyle of violence, substance abuse and internalized rage, with 
drug dealing as the material base. Therefore, ‘street culture’ is an alternative forum to any available to 
‘legitimate’ cultural constellations employed by marginalised people as a structure of rewards, gains, 
profits and sanctions for autonomous personal dignity.  
 
From sub-cultural ethnologies the ecological approach of social disorganization theory cemented the 
rigid divide between the ‘illegitimate’ and ‘legitimate’ sectors of society.45 Social disorganisation theory 
identifies poverty, racial heterogeneity, and the failure of legitimate, regulatory institutions (schools, 
businesses, policing, families), as typical traits of communities with high crime rates This perspective 
draws on social control theory to explain the salience of those characteristics in promoting collective 
crime.46  Organised criminal groups and cultures are theorised as derivatives of the ‘subversive’ 
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socialisation of criminals within the dysfunctional, illegitimate context of society, which is assumed to be 
geographically bounded from the orderly, legitimate sector of society.47 
 
Separating society into a legitimate and an illegitimate sector is reinforced by the law enforcement 
assertions that the relationship between the police and organised crime groups is normatively and 
behaviourally oppositional. Werthman and Piliavin coined the concept ‘ecological contamination’ to 
encapsulate their findings that the underlying hostility between criminal groups and the police emerges 
because either occupy separate cultural and structural conditions which induce their different responses 
to, and perceptions of each other, and of the law.48 Ecological contamination contradicts recurrent 
qualitative findings that suggest a symbiotic relationship between corrupt regulators (police, politicians) 
and organised crime groups to facilitate the profitability, sustainability and expansion of criminal 
enterprises.49 It perpetuates a fragmented understanding of organised crime to protect the ideological 
role and image of the police as frontline combatants against organised crime.50 The normative polarity 
between crime and law enforcement in an enterprise setting not only ignores the regulatory role played 
by corrupt legalist regulators51 in restricting market competition, but it also conceals the commonality 
between legalist and legal regulation in crime business and its non-criminal competitors52. This 
concealment in turn weakens the explanatory capacity and resultant theoretical potency of market-
directed crime theorising, and unfairly hobbles methodologies which emerge from enterprise paradigms. 
 
Nevertheless the placement of law enforcement agents at the intersection between the legitimate and 
illegitimate spheres of society confirms the ideology, authority (and negotiability) of distinctive 
knowledge which the law enforcement ‘voice’ advances over more critical academic research assertions. 
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This placement enables these regulators to monopolise and distort knowledge regarding the reality and 
extent of their involvement as cross-over agents53 in regulating criminal enterprise, facilitating the flow 
of illegal commodities between the legitimate and illegitimate sectors of society, and promoting the 
globalisation of criminal enterprise through discretionary patronage and application of the law. This 
knowledge-management phenomenon has a greater impact on the reality and viability of research 
methodologies than results from any more general observations concerning the internal knowledge 
production of the criminal justice process.54 In organised crime research wedded to a law enforcement 
normative frame (and its essentialist dualities) law enforcement agencies hold the key to accessing 
particular official data forms, and are established as the official account that legitimates research 
findings and discounts contrary interpretations.55 
 
We will show through the case-study method described below, that dualistic understandings promoted 
in original organised crime theorisations56 cumulatively results in fragmented and distorting research 
conclusions about organised criminal networks. 
 
Theory over Methodology: The Negative Repercussions of Integrating Theoretical 
Dichotomies into Qualitative Methodologies for Researching Asian Crime Business 
 
This section of the paper reveals the reasoning behind limited variant analysis and its disproportionate 
influence over organised crime research.  From this position we suggest that a more interactive and 
integrated approach to researching crime business frees up methodology to encounter the market 
complexities of crime business as we have examined it in particular Asian commercial settings. 
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The dialectical understanding of collective criminality, criminal culture, markets and sectors of society, 
fosters and reinforces the validity of, single variable analytical frameworks. Law enforcement 
investigations into the organised crime problem, for example, are preoccupied with ascertaining 
whether organized crime groups are hierarchically structured or loose networks of criminal associates 
and whether their organisation in particular ways pose external threats to otherwise ‘licit’ political-
economies 57. With such an emphasis the dynamics of crime business culture and market involvement 
escape consideration in favour of a structuralist concern for organisations and the ‘holy grail’ of what 
makes them criminogenic; family, race, ethnicity, secrecy, opportunity etc. Subculture ethnographies, 
whose analytical focus is the identification of taxonomies to describe organised crime groups (as 
ethnically-based, indigenous or non-indigenous, hierarchically structured or networked), are concerned 
with the regularities, common patterns and distinguishing features of organised crime groups, where 
these groups operate and in what markets.58  In the resultant constrained research agenda the 
researchers’ focus is channeled towards the mundane and distinctive features of illegitimate markets 
and sectors of society in terms of preconceived single variable analytical frameworks whether in terms 
of positivist biology, subculture’s race and class or social disorganisation’s ecology. Methodologies which 
then direct the research gaze to low level operatives and street-crime relationships may tend to confirm 
the utility of mundane and limited variant analysis not as a consequence of its empirical significance but 
through a concurrence with the normative commitments of these minor players.  These normative 
commitments in turn may have been consciously confirmed and proliferated by more powerful entities 
in the enterprise determiner to conceal the complexities of power and to keep the lower orders 
unstable, factionalised and violent to restrict their commercial access t the orderly profits and expertise 
of the business. 
 
The influence of dialectical tensions over the scope of contemporary organised crime inquiry and the 
prevalence of single variable analytical frameworks despite their limited explanatory power and 
coverage confirms the way earlier theorisations shrouds a “verstehen” methodology59. The negative 
impact of dichotomies on verstehen understanding is exemplified by the law enforcement perspectives 
that formulate ‘the authorised account’ of organised crime, concentrating as it does on members 
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occupying lower rungs of the organised crime group.  This focus, rather than a holistic appreciation of all 
levels of the business and their key players, accommodates a prevailing law and order discourse at the 
expense of distorting the reality of crime as business. Violence, racial division, ethnic rivalry, 
organisational secrecy, mystical loyalty, and more violence typify the law enforcement representations 
of Asian crime business, and these are exemplified at the lower level of the organisation.60 Yet, they are 
atypical of profitable crime business as a total enterprise.  
 
Therefore, the researcher’s conscious or subconscious mis-interpretation of qualitative data because of 
preconceived sub-cultural prejudices, denies a verstehen understanding of the criminal network, 
confirmed by these compromised sampling frames. Epistemological discussions about the validity, 
objectivity and credibility of qualitative data on criminal networks and enterprises are typically critiques 
of the observational status of and knowledge provided by, ‘innovators’/insiders of organised crime as 
opposed to ‘conformists’/outsiders of organised crime61.  ‘Insiders’ of organised crime, referring to 
members of organised crime groups, are assumed to:  
(1) monopolise access to knowledge of various aspects of organised crime and  
(2) be endowed with special insight into matters necessarily obscure to others, thus possessed of a 
penetrating discernment.  
 
Merton (1972) defines the insider–outsider position as an epistemological principle centred on the issue 
of access and whether insiders of organised crime/innovators can provide a unique perspective that can 
never be penetrated by an outside/conformist participant observer. The covert nature of organised 
criminal groups, activities, networks, markets and businesses induces researchers to assume that only 
members of organised crime groups can provide intimate or insider knowledge of organised crime. 
 
Our interactive and integrated methodology reveals the limitation of a static interpretation of the 
insider/outsider duality, and offers a more creative potential application for the discourse.62  If the 
insider/outsider distinctive is not viewed as externalised (from say a law enforcement viewing) but is 
understood as contextually specific and thereby fluid, the capacity of the discourse not to exemplify 
structural rigidity but rather to reveal participant dynamics is enhanced.  We suggest, for instance, to 
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understand why a low level gang member may see himself as an insider and the police an outsider, 
while a higher level entrepreneur knows in actuality the corrupt police officer is both an insider and an 
outsider, has the potential to say much about the knowledge management and meaning creation 
essential at different levels of criminal enterprise.63 
 
By depending on the perspective of overly accessible marginal members in the business network, such 
‘pigeon-hole sampling’ creates stylised and alien market perspectives of criminal enterprise that co-
incidentally confirm the insider/outside, legitimate/illegitimate divide, but only as an ideological rather 
than a methodological tool.64 Researchers who adopt a pigeon-hole sampling wrongly claim the self-
sufficiency of the ‘insider’ perspective for understanding collective criminality, criminal network and 
enterprises. Such a claim ignores qualitative evidence that ‘insiders’ within a particular criminal 
organisation do not constitute a homogenous category and their knowledge of the intricacies of criminal 
networks and the operationalisation of criminal enterprise is fragmented and relative to the position 
they occupy within the hierarchical structure of the group.65 
 
Despite the almost impossible task of gaining access to individuals occupying leadership roles in criminal 
organisations who speak with authority and not mystery about criminal networks and enterprises, 
qualitative researchers celebrate the insider perspective, even with only the telescoped knowledge 
offered by an exclusive population sample of typically accessible ‘insiders’ like members occupying the 
lower rungs of criminal groups or leaders of petty gangs. 
 
This divide between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ in pigeon-hole sampling is challenged by the more holistic 
appreciations of criminal networks and organised crime, interactive, comparative and dynamic as it is 
revealed in our the piracy case-study. Exclusive focus on rank and file members of organised crime 
groups, condemns the representation of organised crime to a moralised ‘us-versus-them’ narrative 
wherein legitimate commerce is the unwilling victim of criminal infiltration, long-suffering regulators are 
out-numbered and out-muscled by a foreign threat and good business is raped by a trade that has no 
moral limits. This misunderstanding of crime business relationships is particularly so where racialist 
stereotyping constructs the engagement between criminology theorising and more conventional market 
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analysis.66  Portrayed this way criminal enterprise is divorced from and destructive of legitimate 
commerce. Smith argues that the institutionalisation of the dichotomy, business versus crime, through 
our terminology and statistical categories blinds us to the legal-illegal continuum of enterprise.67 
 
Resisting Dialectical Tensions and Rectifying Methodology 
 
The paper now moves on to discuss methodologies for avoiding the distraction of false dialectical 
tensions, and from there to create methodological dynamism which can critically employ dialectics 
within the actuality of crime business relationships and specific market contexts. An important strategy 
we adopted in our research for resisting false dichotomies and resultant methodological distortion is to 
construct a holistic theorisation of organised criminal enterprise and networks, rejecting pigeon-hole 
sampling. This section outlines relevant methodological applications in our ethnographic study of the 
Omega gang in the Singapore prisons, and from their investigating the organisation of broadcast media 
piracy in the Malaysian state of Kuala Lumpur.68 Our method grows from lower rank gang interrogation 
to incorporate the higher structures of knowledge governing crime syndicates doing profitable crime 
business.69 
 
Our ethnographic study of the Omega gang in the Singapore prisons sampled both insiders and outsiders. 
We conceptualised ‘outsiders’ as individuals or groups of people who had no interest in claiming  
membership as ‘insiders’ but whose interactions with ‘insiders’ were systematic (as opposed to 
incidental and functional) within the specific context of crime business facilitation, and regulatory cross-
over.70 The outsiders we sampled include members of Chinese secret societies in prison, ex-Omega 
members who subsequently became affiliated with Chinese secret societies, prison officers and guards 
and inmates who are unaffiliated with any criminal group. Insiders comprised members occupying 
various ranks within the hierarchical structure of the Omega gang. 71This inclusive sampling strategy 
facilitated the contextualisation of Omega’s socio-economic status vis-à-vis established Chinese secret 
societies within Singapore society in order to: 
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1) deconstruct the ideology of ethnic affiliation among ‘Malay-Muslims’ as the sole reason for 
Omega’s establishment, 
2) understand the prison context as Omega’s stronghold for recruiting members to facilitate the 
group’s expansion, 
3) explain why Omega members target Malay-Muslim members of Chinese secret societies for 
violent confrontations, and 
4) investigate the incongruence between the anti-Chinese sentiment espoused by low ranking 
Omega members and the cooperative relationship Omega leaders claim to secure with an 
established Chinese syndicate in Kuala Lumpur.72  
Interview responses from rank and file Omega members regarding the reasons underlying the gang’s 
formation, their perception of Malay-Muslim members of Chinese secret societies, and the gang’s 
interaction with Chinese criminal groups generally revolved around a racialised discourse. Omega was 
portrayed as an organisation that prevents the victimisation of Malay-Muslims from the tyranny of 
Chinese secret society members and induces Malay-Muslim members of Chinese secret societies to be 
conscious of their socio-economic marginalisation vis-à-vis their Chinese counterparts.73 The responses 
of these rank and file insiders reflected their status as subjects of false consciousness, whose solidarity 
to the group was a consequence of obligatory ideologies perpetrated by gang leaders. These gang 
members were largely ignorant of the extent and dynamics of criminal enterprise beyond their limited 
involvement. Alternatively, the perspective of outsiders like ex-Omega members who shifted their 
allegiance to established Chinese secret societies challenges Omega’s racial and religious ideologies. The 
primary reasons for leaving the gang was cited by ex-Omega members as including the failure of 
Omega’s leaders:  
(1) to provide its members with any regular or significant pecuniary advantages,  
(2) to redress the unstable socio-economic status of the gang relative to established Chinese criminal 
organisations and  
(3) to secure a symbiotic relationship with corrupt regulators whose patronage will ease the regulatory 
sanctions over Omega members.74  
 
In order to promote solidarity among Omega members and to protect the integrity of the gang where 
steady business profit is illusive or illusory, Omega’s leaders exploit ethnic and religious affiliation among 
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its lower ranked members, to further mask their ignorance of how the criminal enterprise really 
functioned, and to distract attention to away from issues of commercial vulnerability.  For these lower 
gang members (and consciously perpetuated by those above them in the syndicate structure, and by 
corrupt regulators benefitting from a more fluid business environment but relying on sporadic, 
tokenistic law enforcement intervention against low level disorder) it all seemed to be about race, 
patronage, instability and violent encounters.75 
 
Data gathered from low-ranking members of criminal organisations, who are predisposed to petty 
conflicts as a demonstration of masculine bravado, direct confrontations with social control agents and 
inter-gang conflict at an everyday level emphasise disorder, dysfunction and limited understandings of 
an enterprise perspective. Low ranking Omega members were vehement in their derision of Malay 
Muslim members of Chinese criminal groups as ‘infidels’ and traitors to their race, in their animosity 
towards the ‘Chinese’ syndicate that dominates the piracy trade in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, and 
their frustration with the Chinese syndicate that curtails Omega’s struggle to operate an independent 
criminal business. Our interviews with Omega leaders on the other-hand emphasised the necessity to 
deal with a socio-economically dominant Chinese syndicate in Kuala Lumpur in order to secure a 
subordinate collaborative relationship and to receive a financial slice of the piracy trade. Without the 
patronage of corrupt regulators, Omega members are subject to regulatory sanctions, which hinder the 
gang’s orderly and organised pursuit of, and involvement in the media piracy enterprise at whatever 
level, and further condemns them to low order service delivery in another network’s trade.76  
 
Leaders of Omega offer the Malaysian syndicate leader a portion of their profits for the right to market 
syndicate-produced pirated digital versatile discs (DVDs) throughout various locations like train stations, 
bus stations and housing estates in Singapore. The Malaysian syndicate leader benefits economically 
form the ‘royalty’ paid by street-corner gangs who market their products within Malaysia as well as 
internationally. This enterprise structure confirms that the visible ‘insider’ status and positioning of 
individuals does not equate  with or essentially enable monopolistic access to knowledge about 
organised criminal enterprise as some  researchers assume, concluding as they do from the narrow 
knowledge base of low level operatives.77 There is only an incomplete understanding of the complex 
piracy enterprise without an integrated and holistic engagement with the crucial levels of its business 
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structure, with internal enterprise relationships and with external market conditions such as consumer 
preferencing. 
 
Two factors from our ethnographic study of the Omega gang strengthen belief in an inclusive, 
interactive and integrated sampling frame to understand the complex criminal networks that facilitate 
the profitability, sustainability and globalisation of the Malaysian broadcast media piracy trade. First 
factor is learning about Omega’s (the street gang’s) function as franchisers of syndicate-produced 
pirated DVDs of Hollywood, Bollywood and Chinese blockbusters which directs us to explore the 
networks facilitating media piracy beyond the unilateral perspective of the dominant syndicate leader. 
This must be an understanding which engages with ‘foot-soldiers’ and their single variant understanding 
of gang solidarity, as well as the higher gang operatives who liaise outside the gang, seeing the upper 
economic motivations of syndicate enterprise while perpetuating lower level misperceptions for their 
own disciplinary and control purposes. Second is the recognition that insider knowledge regarding the 
organisation of the media piracy trade and the intricacies of criminal networks that support piracy is not 
uniformly distributed either: 
1) throughout the ranks of any particular criminal entity whether the syndicate or the Omega 
street-corner gang or  
2) among criminal entities whether the syndicate of the Omega gang within the illegitimate sector 
of society.78  
With this recognition comes the opportunity for a more holistic methodology which interrogates layers 
of enterprise and employs an attitude to insider/outsider dialectics which is much more nuanced, 
reflective and dynamic.  
 
Researching criminal networks based on the organisation of the media piracy enterprise requires a 
methodological inquiry into the negotiated cooperative relationships between groups of social actors 
integral to the profitability, sustainability, ‘orderability’ and advancement of media piracy as a national, 
regional and international criminal enterprise. The profit-generating and market-sustaining potential of 
these relationships became apparent from qualitative interviews with the syndicate leader, gang leaders 
and foot soldiers of the Omega gang and cross-over agents including the police, custom officers and 
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directors of the Malaysian Film Censorship Board (MFCB).79  ‘Outsiders’ (when viewed from a gang 
perspective) in the form of corrupt regulators who negotiate and interact directly and systematically 
with leaders of the syndicate and the Omega gang, but who are not members of these organisations per 
se, possess a cross-market view of crime business and what distinguishes the grey porous barrier of 
market legitimacy. The perspective of these corrupt regulators, as insiders depending on the aspect of 
the piracy business they facilitate and as outsiders unaffiliated with any organised crime groups, possess 
the capacity to illuminate the contextual variables necessary for the profitability and practicality of the 
media piracy enterprise, and crucially to its consumer persistence and normalcy. Corrupt legalist 
regulators employ naive normative distinctions to their advantage in concealing their cross-over and in 
adding value to their perverted regulatory service.  At the same time their opinions and understandings 
shed light on the intersection between crime business and its non-criminal competitors, and challenge 
the simple dialectic between legitimate and illegitimate market.  That said, outside the research setting 
the views of legalist regulators and cross-over agents commonly tend to perpetuate the law and order 
mystification of the law enforcement opposition to crime business and illegal markets.  The researcher 
needs to be mindful of role such informants may be playing in the provision of insights and 
understandings in different operational contexts. 
 
Chasing levels of knowledge and engagements within and without criminal enterprise networks provides 
the additional methodological attraction of trialngulating and telescoping information sources and 
relationships. For instance, the insights offered by several MFCB directors focused our inquiry into the 
syndicate leader’s strategies to ensure the marketability of syndicate-produced pirated DVDs over 
legitimate products.  This took our research into the realm of market modelling when it became clear 
that crime business was not to be understood (and normatively qualified) primarily in terms of supply.  
The train of understanding then required a methodological progression from the burgeoning pirated 
DVD market operated by individuals and criminal groups, to the satisfaction of normalised consumer 
demands80.  
 
At the upper levels of criminal enterprise and regulatory cross-over in the trade of broadcast piracy, the 
process of negotiating the interests of the directors of MFCB in order to obtain original copies of new 
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film releases is of paramount importance to the syndicate leader, in ensuring a lucrative enterprise of 
piracy. In a market sense, and of equal and co-incidentally critical importance as a criminal 
entrepreneur’s motivation is the generation and perpetuation of a loyal and recurrent consumer 
market. Following an acceptance of a financial settlement from the syndicate leader, corrupt police 
officials exercise their cooperative and facilitative role in the piracy venture by executing the following 
tasks:  
 to overlook the illicit relationship between the syndicate leaders and the directors of the MFCB, 
which facilitates the enterprise of piracy and violates copyright law,  
 to exploit their rank, status and authority to eliminate potential disruptions posed by other 
criminal entities that attempt to subvert the arrangement among the syndicate, directors of the 
film censorship board and the police.   
 
The crime boss in turn deals with the politicians and senior regulators crucial for the profit of his trade as 
might any legitimate businessman negotiating with regulatory agencies and competition frameworks.81 
His capacity for seamless cross over between the transaction of social and commercial legitimacy is 
indicative of his status in the ‘two societies’ and the eventual normalcy of this crime business, whether it 
be from the perspective of the compromised government official or the normalised recurrent consumer. 
 
Our qualitative investigation into the enterprise of broadcast media piracy revealed that the profitability, 
sustainability and globalisation of the market-oriented media piracy trade are dependent on the illicit 
negotiations prompted by the syndicate leader to bring about the following: 
1) the corruptibility of regulators like Malaysian police, politicians, custom officers and the Film 
Censorship Board to enhance consumer satisfaction and syndicate dominance over the piracy 
trade, 
2) consumer normalisation of the illegitimacy of selling, distributing and consuming pirated DVDs 
as a global enterprise on the basis of prevalence, convenience and price-sensitivity, and 
3) the collaboration of the Omega street-corner gang as franchisers of the syndicate-produced 
pirated DVDs in neighbouring countries like Singapore and Thailand. 
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Participants in the media piracy network cross-over boundaries of class, race, gang membership, and 
bridge the legitimate and illegitimate commercial and political sectors of society to establish a 
collaborative and lucrative crime business  by negotiating their asymmetrical social capital, according to 
any conventional commercial cost-benefit analysis.82 Contrary to the violence and disorder that typically 
characterise descriptions of Asian organised crime, the narrative of Omega leaders exposes the ordered 
and functional organisation of the illegitimate Malaysian markets for the sale and distribution of pirated 
materials. While Omega’s rank and file celebrate violence and intimidation, in network reality these 
ways of doing business are seen as disorderly and are disvalued and discouraged at the decision-making 
end of the enterprise. Data on this gathered from the syndicate leader at the other end of the enterprise 
from a violent and disorderly foot soldier reveals dynamic negotiations to be the primary mode of 
conflict resolution among key players within the enterprise of piracy to protect the stability of criminal 
business, and to improve market positioning.83 
 
During participant observation in nightclubs owned by the syndicate leader, we witnesses the 
commercial interaction between the syndicate leader, Omega’s leaders and corrupt regulators, both the 
police and a few directors of the MFCB, and were also able to engage them in informal conversation to 
gain insight into their negotiated collaboration with the syndicate leader.84 The similarities between this 
and any normal trade negotiation in the legitimate market were remarkable. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper offers in outline a fresh approach to the study of crime business, hopefully unburdened by 
much of the conventional organised crime85 thinking which, we argue, has deflected a balanced 
understanding of criminal enterprise particularly in Asia, and has infected the recent development of 
international regulatory conventions. Not only have such understandings been constrained by externally 
constructed, limited variant analysis, but particularly in the analysis of Asian crime business, they have 
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de-legitimated fertile theorising such as enterprise and crime analysis by dominating research discourse 
with false causalities such as the critical role of race in crime organisation. 
 
The paper’s critical engagement with flawed methodologies commences by confronting and exposing 
the ideological motivations for dualism in conventional organised crime research. So as to suggest a 
cognitive pathway beyond this restrictive normative frame, we argue it is essential to appreciate the 
potency and resilience of certain normative preconditions allowing some methodologies in organised 
crime research and quarantining others. For instance, law enforcement language buoyed up by popular 
culture representations of gangs, syndicates and crime bosses has become the accepted starting point 
for much research in the field, and for consequent law-making, domestic and international.86 Data 
collection and analysis from this perspective, we suggest, plays its own part in organised crime 
mystification and as such retards the critical utility of market appreciations of crime business and 
enterprise theory explanatory as it can be of the dynamics of Asian black commerce. 
 
The paper moves on to reveal how distracted and distorted theorising infects research methodology and 
its conclusions. In this way method becomes the flawed bi-product of value-laden theorising rather than 
realistic methodology informing and confirming value-free theorising. We advance an alternative 
relationship between theorising and method so that resultant analytical approach is to crime business as 
it operates in the market, and not as law enforcement perspectives want us to believe it to be. From 
here, it is reasonable to speculate that the foundations of international law-making as a regulatory 
intervention against TOC will have at their disposal alternative considerations of crime business in the 
market-place and realistic expectations for law-enforcement influence. 
 
The paper concludes by propounding an integrated theoretical perspective minus the distraction of 
duality.  Based on our field experience with Asian crime business and market conditions, we formulate 
and introduce an integrative methodology which is a dynamic, interactive and multi-dimensional 
framework for understanding criminal enterprise, entrepreneurial motivation and crime business 
market conditions. If law-making it to emerge as a research-based exercise then, particularly at the 
international level, we believe an integrative methodology avoids for legal outcomes naïve pluralism or 
the dominance of any politicized normative position. Law in such an informed context can give voice to 
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the new theories, models and language of TOC which Standing seeks to be produced from more realistic 
research. 
 
The need to manage distracting or dysfunctional dualities about crime business as essentially disorderly 
and confrontational is one major critical motivation for developing a multi-variant and comparative 
research methodology with capacity to interrogate crucial decision sites in crime business, so as to 
reflect the dynamic, fluid and interactive internal organisation of criminal enterprise, and its external 
dependancies. Such a comparative research frame requires viewing crime business from cross-over 
agency perspectives to the extent that non-member maximisers comfortably make the switch 
without/within criminal enterprise structures in order to facilitate profitability and market share.   
 
Any attempt to understand the organisation of criminal or legitimate business must focus on at least 
two groups of dynamically interacting social actors, communities or enterprise frames. Ethnographies of 
particular criminal entities make little sense without including a second napkin. Comparative possibilities 
include: 
 analysing inter-gang relations,  
 the interaction between a criminal organisation and the community of which it is a part,  
 parts of the business to each other,  
 service gangs and umbrella syndicates,  
 business to the consumer, and  
 a criminal organisation to law enforcement agents, and the markets they regulate.  
 
Social control perspectives are distracting and distorted without advancing an analysis of the interaction 
between discretionary law enforcement and its impact on criminal entities. International law advancing 
a functionalist law enforcement agenda in denial of or out of touch with the market location of crime 
business and the market preferencing potential of corrupt legalist regulators, exemplifies this criticism. 
No doubt international law in all its forms is taking the issue of TOC seriously. Yet commentators accept 
that the success of this engagement is not a matter for lawyers alone. 
Dealing with organized crime and gang violence is a practical and also a theoretical challenge 
involving highly complex and dynamic phenomena. While national legislators have reacted in 
very different ways according to the peculiarities that they (believe they) identify, the fight 
against organized crime, gangs, and gang violence has increasingly become the subject of 
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international regulation. It focuses on the transnational dimensions of organized crime and 
expresses the will of states to co-operate more effectively and to harmonize national laws. A 
complex international framework has been established, but it still lacks universal acceptance 
and full implementation. According to the prevailing doctrine, international law governing the 
use of force can become relevant only insofar as the criminal acts in question can be attributed 
to a state. In exceptional circumstances, however, organized crime and gang violence may fall 
within the scope of IHL and international criminal law; in general, this requires that the criminal 
collectives have developed into organizations possessing powers and/or structures similar to 
those of states.87 
 
Interestingly, holistic and integrated research into crime business con enable more effective law-making 
at the international level, as well as offering a means for critically evaluating international law 
interventions, a feature which is distinctly absent from the transformation of international law into 
global governance policy. 
 
An interactive and comparative methodology is indispensable in a context where the research attempts 
to grasp the dynamic interaction among groups of social actors who cooperate in the interest of 
facilitating criminal enterprises or any other ancillary venture (legitimate business, political campaigns), 
the nature of that cooperation, its basis and how it is established. Our work envisages criminal 
enterprise as an interactive, integrated and dynamic field of commercial relationships and arrangements. 
This field flows across a range of regulatory situations and ‘boundaries of permission’. The resultant 
crime opportunities in a business sense are as a consequence, adaptable to the conditions of market 
profit as may be any legitimate commercial endeavour. They need to be researched as such. At the risk 
of simply hinting at the dimensions of a comparative aspirations for enterprise theory they are these: 
 Within the context of the gang and the syndicate it is crucial to employ two napkins 
methodology, breaking free of a single variant, mono-perspective analytical tool, whether race, 
gender, class, religion, to research the emergence, organisation, legitimacy and authority of a 
particular criminal entity;  
 In our analysis between the syndicate and the Omega gang at the meso level, internactive 
methodology isolates the analytical tools that explain the motivation of the Omega gang to 
negotiate a subordinate position to the syndicate, the reason for the syndicate allowing the 
                                                          
87
 Hauck & Peterke, 2010, p.436 
30 
 
Omega gang to franchise its DVDs, and the way this relationship of dependency leads to 
essential service delivery and facilitation, determines power relations, defining the 
organisational structure of each criminal entity; 
 Analysing the interaction between syndicate leaders and corrupt regulators at the macro level, 
interactive methodology illuminates the way the regulatory market frames are negotiated and 
utilised for individual and collective benefit, as well as for determining and certifying market 
boundary meanings; 
 Interactive methodology enables a comparison between legitimate enterprise and criminal 
business, specifically the commercial interests and arrangements that eventuate in a profitable 
crime business and its proliferation/perpetuation in order to dissolve stylised representations of 
criminal business as disorderly and dysfunctional (antithetical to legitimate business).  
 Across complementary business enterprises, recognising particularly in market positioning and 
capital sourcing in trade relations, enterprises (legitimate and illegitimate) collaborate and 
complete.  Where do illegitimate arrangements form the linkages for these relations? 
 Interactive research method dissolves the insider/outsider dichotomy that has typically plagued 
the sampling process, repositioning the epistemological debate surrounding the validity, 
credibility and objectivity of insider versus outsider data, and moving on to a new 
methodological consideration of the research mission with cross-over at its centre. 
 
Distinguishing between illegitimate and legitimate market representation is not the reason for or the 
reality of the proposed interactive analysis, and is potential influence over international law making, if 
such research is to be given political and economic purchase.  A mandate to take research seriously as a 
law-making and policy-generating precursor rests in the resounding ratification of the UNCAOTC, the 
powerful political rhetoric behind its limited purposes and expansive intent, and the reiteration of these 
commitments ten years on. 
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